Reflections on the Imperial Sugar Refinery After Action Report

The Chatham Emergency Management Agency has released their After Action Report (AAR) for the Imperial Sugar Refinery Explosion; it can be found in .pdf form at http://www.chathamemergency.org/docs/AAR%20Full%20Size.pdf

The AAR should be read by amateur radio operators interested in emergency communications; there are some important lessons learned to be digested. Radio Monitoring hobbyists interested in public safety communications may want to read it as well, as it covers communications issues that could impact our area's communications plans in the future.


Communications
ESF #2 Statement of Issue 1 addresses the problems of interagency communications. Although many of the responding units utilize the Chatham-Effingham TRS, some responders such as those from South Carolina and some outlying Coastal Georgia counties do not use that system. As a result, direct communications between units and Incident Command were sometimes problematic. Although it is possible to relay communications through a command post with multiple radios, that process can cause hazardous delays that could compromise safety. When operating in a hazardous situation such as the one at the sugar refinery, it is necessary for units to talk directly to each other rather than wait for relays between multiple frequency bands.

This should be less of a problem in the future due to the grant for public safety communications improvements that I recently posted about; plans are in the works to expand the communications network along the coast, allowing for greater interoperability. The explosion highlighted the need for the work to go forward. In regards to the South Carolina responders, the radio system they use is compatible with the radio system used here; common talkgroups (such as fire, law enforcement, and medical common talkgroups) could be programmed into radios. Another solution could be the use of an interoperability system such as a Motobridge. A Motobridge could alleviate these problems as well, but there would be delay in setup. There would be a shorter delay in setting up a permanently sited Motobridge or a longer one in deploying and setting up a temporary Motobridge.

This is of particular interest to the public safety monitoring hobbyist. It could have a direct impact on what we listen to and how we listen to it.


Incident Command System
ESF #5 Statement of Issue 1 addresses knowledge of and use of the Incident Command System (ICS) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS). CEMA recommends that principles of the ICS be adhered to in all incidents. CEMA states that more than 1200 hours of ICS Level 300 and 400 training have been conducted. There are only a few agencies here that use the ICS on a regular basis on practically all of their operations. If agencies aren't practicing the ICS on regular, single agency incidents, how can they be expected to apply ICS principles on a major, multiple agency incidents. Classroom training and a couple of exercises a year cannot result in the same level of fluency that regular use of the ICS system can.

ESF #5 Statement of Issue 2 addresses the Chatham County Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The Chatham EOC and the CEMA administrative offices are not co-located. The EOC is at the County Annex and the administrative offices are downtown. CEMA recommends that their offices should be located with the EOC as soon as funds and facilities become available. Funds and Facilities should be made available by the county now, before Hurricane Season is here.

ESF #5 Statement of Issue 3 addresses how units "self dispatched" themselves to the scene and how their was no Incident Command to coordinate. They recommend that an Incident Commander should establish a Unified Command to alleviate the problems caused by the inflow of those units. There is no doubt that a Unified Command is needed, but units should also not "self dispatch" themselves to the scene. The street has to work both ways; the Unified Command must be established but the units must wait until requested and work with the Unified Command.

ICS Problems had a follow on effect onto other aspects of the response. Resources (ESF #7) were impacted by the ICS Problems; the lack of a Unified Command resulted in some needed resources being turned away from the scene. Ingress/Egress and Staging (under ESF #13) were impacted by the same issues; lack of communication between Fire and Law Enforcement combined with self dispatched units restricted the single ingress/egress corridor and hampered asset staging. This is why the amateur radio community needs to be familiar with the ICS and that amateur radio operators wanting to participate in emergency communications need to take the NIMS courses. The amateur radio community cannot be a weak link in the chain; in order to fit into the response, amateur radio operators need a working knowledge of ICS so that they know why things are going on around them and how they fit into the overall plan.

The AAR also addresses time limits on Incident Command and General Staff shifts. They correctly state that fatigue from extended shifts "impairs ones judgement and can expose emergency personnel to excessive danger." This must also apply to amateur radio operators taking part in emergency communications. From personnel experience during Hurricane Floyd, I know that long hours can reduce ones effectiveness. Rotating operators and making sure operators get rest will eliminate mistakes. Mistakes can not only embarrass the amateur radio community and damage it's reputation, they can put others in dangerous and harmful situations.


External Affairs
ESF #15, Statement of Issue 1 addresses the release of information regarding the incident. There were problems with incorrect information being released and information be released prematurely. The Pubic Information Officer and his/her delegates should be the only ones releasing information, no one else (not even elected officials!)

This relates to both the amateur radio operator and the public safety monitoring hobbyist. Amateur Radio Operators should be careful of what they say over the air and what they say off the air in regards to what could be considered sensitive information regarding an incident. Be careful of what you say, the information may not be intended for public consumption at the time. Likewise, the monitoring hobbyist should be careful what they say about what they are hearing and when they say it. Radio traffic may sometimes be inaccurate and incomplete; keep this in mind before talking about what you hear and making judgements on what you hear.


Air Operations
CEMA recommends the activation of the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) during future incidents such as this. The ASOC is a mobile command and control center operated by members of the Chatham County Aviation Division. The public safety monitoring hobbyist should plan to search and scan aviation frequencies during future exercises and incidents. CEMA has also come to agreements with local helicopter owners and operators to fill in when the local, state, federal, and military aviation assets are unavailable.


I would like to stress that the above opinions are purely my own. The do not reflect the opinions of amateur radio clubs, the Amateur Radio Emergency Service, or anyone else.

Mac McCormick, KF4LMT
kf4lmt@comcast.net

CEMA Issues Imperial Sugar Refinery Explosion After Action Report

I was working on a post about CEMA's After Action Report for the Imperial Sugar Refinery explosion with hopes of posting it tonight. A power outtage that caused the file to disappear has delayed those plans. Having to start typing from scratch, I hope to get it up some time tomorrow afternoon or evening.

In the meantime, you can find the After Action Report here. It is a docmument that Amateur Radio Operators interested in Emergency Communications and the radio hobbyist interested in public safety monitoring should read.

Mac McCormick, KF4LMT
kf4lmt@comcast.net

Imperial Sugar Refinery Explosion Monitoring Notes

I have delayed posting much on the Imperial Sugar Refinery Explosion because the search for the missing is ongoing and they had problems with information going to the media before families were notified. I have finally decided to go ahead and post this for two reasons. First, almost all of these talkgroups are already known and published on RadioReference. Second, if an elected official is going to bypass the correct public information channels, I don't think that this post is going to be a problem.

The agency listing below is most certainly incomplete; it is composed of agencies that I either heard on air or that I heard references to on air.

Fire Agencies Involved:
-----------------------
Port Wentworth FD
Garden City FD
Savannah FD
Pooler FD
Bloomingdale FD
Southside FD
Isle of Hope FD
GA ANG Crash/Fire
Fort Stewart/Hunter AAF FD
Tybee Island FD
Thunderbolt FD
Effingham Fire/Rescue
Bryan Fire
Screven Fire
Metter FD
Bluffton FD

EMS Involved:
-------------
MedStar
Southside EMS
Effingham EMS
Bryan Co. EMS
Bulloch Co. EMS
Fort Stewart/Hunter EMS
Glynn Co. EMS
Liberty Co. EMS
McIntosh Co. EMS
Jasper Co. EMS
LifeStar

Law Enforcement Involved:
-------------------------
Port Wentworth PD
Garden City PD
SCMPD
Chatham SO
Chatham BOE PD
GSP
MCCD
GPA PD

Invesigative Agencies
---------------------
Georgia Fire Marshalls
ATF
OSHA



Chatham-Effingham TRS
---------------------
3632 Fire Tac 1, Incident Command
-ICS Callsigns (i.e. COMMAND, OPERATIONS, etc.), Fire units
using regular callsigns, SUPPRESSION TEAM #, SEARCH TEAM #

37072 Fire Common, Operations
-Fire Units using regular unit numbering, SUPRESSION TEAM #,
SEARCH TEAM #, ICS callsigns (i.e. COMMAND, OPERATIONS, etc.)
-GSAR OPS, GSAR #, GSAR TEAM 1, GSAR TEAM 2
-BLACKHAWK 1 (?)

3664 Fire Tac 2, Tactical
-Fire Units using regular unit numbering, SUPRESSION TEAM #,
SEARCH TEAM #, ICS callsigns (i.e. COMMAND, OPERATIONS, etc.)

3696 Fire Tac 3, Tactical
-Fire Units using regular unit numbering, SUPRESSION TEAM #,
SEARCH TEAM #, ICS callsigns (i.e. COMMAND, OPERATIONS, etc.)

36976 Savannah Fire Fireground 1, Tactical
37008 Savannah Fire Fireground 2, Tactical
54128 SCMPD B11 (P25), Law Enforcement Ops
7920 MedStar Dispatch 1

8016 MedStar Dispatch 2, Medical Transport Coordination
-MedStar Units, 1##, SO #

6256 CEMA 2, Tactical
-Fire Units using regular unit numbering, SUPRESSION TEAM #,
SEARCH TEAM #, ICS callsigns (i.e. COMMAND, OPERATIONS, etc.)

6288 CEMA 3, EMA and Logistics Ops
-LOGISTICS, CEMA #, ICS callsigns

2672 Chatham SO
3824 Southside FD Dispatch
4112 Southside EMS Medic 1
4144 Southside EMS Medic 2
4528 Port Wentworth PD
4592 Port Wentworth FD
4880 Thunderbolt Fire Tac 1
4944 Garden City PD
5040 Garden City FD
5200 Tybee Island FD
5424 Pooler FD
6224 CEMA 1
6640 ANG Crash/Fire
7088 Chatham Co. BOE PD
7760 Isle of Hope FD
12944 MedStar Admin (P25)
24656 Effingham Fire Rescue Dispatch
24688 Effingham EMS Dispatch
25104 Effingham Fireground 1
25136 Effingham Fireground 2
25200 Effingham Fire Rescue Admin 1
25328 Effingham EMA
36912 Savannah Fire Admin
50576 Savannah Vehicle Maintenance
53264 SCMPD A1, PCT 1 Car-to-Car (P250
53280 SCMPD B1, PCT 1 Primary (P25)
53328 SCMPD B2, PCT 2 Primary (P25)
53644 SCMPD B9, Westside Dispatch (P25)
54064 SCMPD (P25)
54112 SCMPD B10 (P25)


Fort Stewart/Hunter AAF TRS
---------------------------
2576 EMS Dispatch
2672 Fire Tac
3504 Hunter Crash/Fire


Conventional
------------
462.975 LifeStar
-LIFESTAR, LIFESTAR BASE

156.800 Marine VHF Ch. 16
-MSU Savannah clg 25671

157.050 Marine VHF Ch. 21
-RESCUE 6542, 6553 (HH-65C, Savannah); debris search and
standby
-25652, 25524, 25671 (25' boat), 192526 (19' boat)
-Auxiliary 770, 577, 957
-Station Tybee, Sector Charleston
-MSU Savannah
-SCMPD Marine Patrol
-6561 for video/survey work on 02-08-08

345.000 USCG Ops Primary
-Air Station Savannah, 6542, 6553

157.100 Marine VHF Ch. 22
-River closing broadcasts

156.650 Marine VHF Ch. 13
-USCG boats wkg vessels entering/leaving security zone
-Moran Tugs (providing water pumping support due to low water
pressure from plant system and hydrants

415.1625 Hunter AAF Transient Alert
-discussion of how many portable lighting units they had
to send to incident

References were made to handheld VHF radios, probably being used to communicate with non-800 FDs like Screven and Bryan Counties.


Aviation
--------
124.975 Hunter Tower
-LIFEGUARD N117LS (LifeStar)
-LIFEGUARD N911AM (Air Med)
-LIFEGUARD N116LN (Emory Flight 2)
-LIFEGUARD N350DH (Rescue Air)
-LIFEGUARD N224LF
-LIFEGUARD N506RA (Rescue Air)
-LIFEGUARD N308CG (Air Med)
-RESCUE 6542 (HH-65C, USCG, Savannah)
-RESCUE 6553 (HH-65C, USCG, Savannah)
-COAST GUARD 6561 (HH-65C, USCG, Savannah)

119.100 Savannah IAP Towr
120.400 Savannah Approach/Departure
-EAGLE 1 (MD 500, Chatham Co.)
-EAGLE 2 (MD-500, Chatham Co.)
-LIFEGUARD N117LS (LifeStar)
-LIFEGUARD N911AM (Air Med)
-LIFEGUARD N116LN (Life Net)
-LIFEGUARD N350DH (Rescue Air)
-LIFEGUARD N224LF
-LIFEGUARD N506RA (Rescue Air)
-LIFEGUARD N308CG (Air Med)
-RESCUE 6542 (HH-65C, USCG, Savannah)
-RESCUE 6553 (HH-65C, USCG, Savannah)
-COAST GUARD 6561 (HH-65C, USCG, Savannah)

123.025 Airborne Operations, Air-to-Ground, probably
working LZ near triage area (PW Elementary?)

Medevac Helicopter Ops were out of the Memorial Hospital Helideck, the Jenkins High Schoool athletic field, Savannah IAP, and the incident scene LZ. Helicopters from Hunter AAF were used for medevacs during the night and early morning of 7/8 February but I did not hear them because I was sleeping. B-169 AVN CH-47s were on standby for water drops on 8 February but not used; ARNG personnel were on scene to provide comms with the CH-47s if needed. EAGLE 2 was used for water drops on 11 February.

Mac McCormick, KF4LMT
kf4lmt@comcast.net

Imperial Sugar Refinery Explosion

As I am sure everyone is aware by now, there was an explosion last night at the Imperial Sugar Refinery in Port Wentworth. Fire Departments, EMS Services, Law Enforcement Agencies, and medevac helicopter services from throughout the area and state responded to assist. This is easily the biggest incident in the Savannah area since 1995's Powell-Duffryn explosion.

I will post more comprehensively on monitored communications later, but here is what was in primary use last night and this morning:

3632 - Fire Tac 1, Incident Command
37072 - Fire Common, Operations
3664 - Fire Tac 2, Tactical
36976 - Savannah Fire Fireground 1, Tactical
37008 - Savannah Fire Fireground 2, Tactical
54128 - SCMPD B11 (P25), Law Enforcement Ops
7920 - MedStar Dispatch 1
8016 - MedStar Dispatch 2, Medical Transport Coordination
6288 - CEMA 3, EMA and Logistics Ops

462.975 - LifeStar
157.050 - Marine VHF Ch. 21
345.000 - USCG Ops Primary
119.100 - Savannah IAP Tower
124.975 - Hunter AAF Tower


Mac McCormick, KF4LMT
kf4lmt@comcast.net