Reflections on the Imperial Sugar Refinery After Action Report

The Chatham Emergency Management Agency has released their After Action Report (AAR) for the Imperial Sugar Refinery Explosion; it can be found in .pdf form at http://www.chathamemergency.org/docs/AAR%20Full%20Size.pdf

The AAR should be read by amateur radio operators interested in emergency communications; there are some important lessons learned to be digested. Radio Monitoring hobbyists interested in public safety communications may want to read it as well, as it covers communications issues that could impact our area's communications plans in the future.


Communications
ESF #2 Statement of Issue 1 addresses the problems of interagency communications. Although many of the responding units utilize the Chatham-Effingham TRS, some responders such as those from South Carolina and some outlying Coastal Georgia counties do not use that system. As a result, direct communications between units and Incident Command were sometimes problematic. Although it is possible to relay communications through a command post with multiple radios, that process can cause hazardous delays that could compromise safety. When operating in a hazardous situation such as the one at the sugar refinery, it is necessary for units to talk directly to each other rather than wait for relays between multiple frequency bands.

This should be less of a problem in the future due to the grant for public safety communications improvements that I recently posted about; plans are in the works to expand the communications network along the coast, allowing for greater interoperability. The explosion highlighted the need for the work to go forward. In regards to the South Carolina responders, the radio system they use is compatible with the radio system used here; common talkgroups (such as fire, law enforcement, and medical common talkgroups) could be programmed into radios. Another solution could be the use of an interoperability system such as a Motobridge. A Motobridge could alleviate these problems as well, but there would be delay in setup. There would be a shorter delay in setting up a permanently sited Motobridge or a longer one in deploying and setting up a temporary Motobridge.

This is of particular interest to the public safety monitoring hobbyist. It could have a direct impact on what we listen to and how we listen to it.


Incident Command System
ESF #5 Statement of Issue 1 addresses knowledge of and use of the Incident Command System (ICS) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS). CEMA recommends that principles of the ICS be adhered to in all incidents. CEMA states that more than 1200 hours of ICS Level 300 and 400 training have been conducted. There are only a few agencies here that use the ICS on a regular basis on practically all of their operations. If agencies aren't practicing the ICS on regular, single agency incidents, how can they be expected to apply ICS principles on a major, multiple agency incidents. Classroom training and a couple of exercises a year cannot result in the same level of fluency that regular use of the ICS system can.

ESF #5 Statement of Issue 2 addresses the Chatham County Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The Chatham EOC and the CEMA administrative offices are not co-located. The EOC is at the County Annex and the administrative offices are downtown. CEMA recommends that their offices should be located with the EOC as soon as funds and facilities become available. Funds and Facilities should be made available by the county now, before Hurricane Season is here.

ESF #5 Statement of Issue 3 addresses how units "self dispatched" themselves to the scene and how their was no Incident Command to coordinate. They recommend that an Incident Commander should establish a Unified Command to alleviate the problems caused by the inflow of those units. There is no doubt that a Unified Command is needed, but units should also not "self dispatch" themselves to the scene. The street has to work both ways; the Unified Command must be established but the units must wait until requested and work with the Unified Command.

ICS Problems had a follow on effect onto other aspects of the response. Resources (ESF #7) were impacted by the ICS Problems; the lack of a Unified Command resulted in some needed resources being turned away from the scene. Ingress/Egress and Staging (under ESF #13) were impacted by the same issues; lack of communication between Fire and Law Enforcement combined with self dispatched units restricted the single ingress/egress corridor and hampered asset staging. This is why the amateur radio community needs to be familiar with the ICS and that amateur radio operators wanting to participate in emergency communications need to take the NIMS courses. The amateur radio community cannot be a weak link in the chain; in order to fit into the response, amateur radio operators need a working knowledge of ICS so that they know why things are going on around them and how they fit into the overall plan.

The AAR also addresses time limits on Incident Command and General Staff shifts. They correctly state that fatigue from extended shifts "impairs ones judgement and can expose emergency personnel to excessive danger." This must also apply to amateur radio operators taking part in emergency communications. From personnel experience during Hurricane Floyd, I know that long hours can reduce ones effectiveness. Rotating operators and making sure operators get rest will eliminate mistakes. Mistakes can not only embarrass the amateur radio community and damage it's reputation, they can put others in dangerous and harmful situations.


External Affairs
ESF #15, Statement of Issue 1 addresses the release of information regarding the incident. There were problems with incorrect information being released and information be released prematurely. The Pubic Information Officer and his/her delegates should be the only ones releasing information, no one else (not even elected officials!)

This relates to both the amateur radio operator and the public safety monitoring hobbyist. Amateur Radio Operators should be careful of what they say over the air and what they say off the air in regards to what could be considered sensitive information regarding an incident. Be careful of what you say, the information may not be intended for public consumption at the time. Likewise, the monitoring hobbyist should be careful what they say about what they are hearing and when they say it. Radio traffic may sometimes be inaccurate and incomplete; keep this in mind before talking about what you hear and making judgements on what you hear.


Air Operations
CEMA recommends the activation of the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) during future incidents such as this. The ASOC is a mobile command and control center operated by members of the Chatham County Aviation Division. The public safety monitoring hobbyist should plan to search and scan aviation frequencies during future exercises and incidents. CEMA has also come to agreements with local helicopter owners and operators to fill in when the local, state, federal, and military aviation assets are unavailable.


I would like to stress that the above opinions are purely my own. The do not reflect the opinions of amateur radio clubs, the Amateur Radio Emergency Service, or anyone else.

Mac McCormick, KF4LMT
kf4lmt@comcast.net